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Abstract
In this work we analyze the language competition problem by using an in-
teracting agent-based model which interpolates the classical Schelling and
Voter models. Briey, an agent may change its place of residence or his lan-
guage when he is surrounded by more individuals of the other kind than the
ones he can tolerate. We analyze this dynamic process in terms of the free
space to move in, the pressure to change the language, and the propensity to
change location. We identify the dierent regimes and the relationship with
the language competition problem.
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1. Introduction
A language evolves with its speakers, and then it is well adapted to natural
environment, history, traditions and customs. Usually, there is no translation
between two languages for key concepts in a given culture, and the loss of
those languages will have several negative consequences. Several examples
can be gathered from all around the world: among the Amuesha tribe in
Peruvian Amazon, the diversity of crops was reduced due to the loss of
knowledge associated to the language endangerment (see UNESCO [1]), and
there exist almost 3000 endangered languages in the world.
The study of language dynamics was started by Nettle in [2], who con-
sidered several agents interacting in a given network, and changing their
languages according to certain rules. These kinds of models are related to
the voter model introduced by Holley and Liggett [3], and extensively studied
by researchers from complex systems and statistical mechanics. We refer the
interested reader to [4, 5] for more references and details.
In those agent-based models, extinction of one of the competing languages
is predicted. A dierent approach based on ordinary or partial dierential
equations started with the work of Abrams and Strogatz [6]. Their mean eld
model of language competition predicts the extinction of one of the competing
languages. The possibility of coexistence of two languages in the same region
was rst pointed out by Pinasco and Romanelli in [7], including resources
for each population as in Lotka-Volterra models. Previously, Patriarca and
Leppanen [8] showed that two languages, each one with its own region of
inuence, can survive with a tiny zone of coexistence in the border between
them. Later, Kandler and Steele [9] showed that extinction of one of the
languages is the only stable outcome of Lotka-Volterra models, even when
there is spatial dependence under stronger assumptions on both populations:
mainly, one population can't extract resources from the other one, a very
restrictive condition that excludes slavery and exploitation, together with
any kind of symbiosis benecial to both groups. Also, Patriarca and Heinsalu
[10] showed that coexistence is possible due to natural barriers (e.g. islands,
mountains).
On the other hand, there are several phenomena related to language dy-
namics that those models fail to reect. One of them is the existence of
ghettos, and the formation of clusters of people of similar origins in big cities
(like Little Italy in New York, or Chinatown in dierent cities around the
world). Although the segregation in ghettos was imposed in the past by
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some central authority, today they emerge in Europe and America as a re-
sult of several individual decisions. Also, the existence of large areas with a
huge number of languages, mainly West and Central Africa, Central Amer-
ica, South-East Asia, and the Pacic Island [1, 11, 12], was not completely
explained: the existence of natural barriers explains the case of Mexico or the
Pacic Island (see [10]); however, the African diversity of languages despite
the absence of barriers remains to be explained.
In this work we propose a dierent mechanism of language competition, a
mix between the Voter model, and the Schelling segregation model [13, 14]. In
his model, Schelling showed how individual residential preferences impacted
on segregated neighborhood patterns, and how even modest levels of racial
preferences can be amplied into high levels of global segregation. In his
original model, the agents are black or white, and they are located in a
square lattice with a proportion of empty sites. Each agent has a xed
tolerance, which is a bound of the rate of people of the opposite color that
agent tolerates among his neighbors, and when this bound is reached, that
agent decides to migrate to some empty site.
What happens if the agent can change either his color or his position?
As far as we know, that option was not previously considered, since this
does not make sense when we speak about racial characteristics. However,
this is a clearly valid option in many social and economic situations, where
a frustrated agent can choose between trying to adapt to his neighbors or
migrate to a better place. A mix between Axelrod and Schelling models was
proposed in [15]. In this work, two neighbor agents are selected at random
and if they do not share any characteristic, one of them changes its position;
this model is reduced to the Schelling model in our case. A network evolution
model in [16] has a link rewiring or opinion change as a consequence of the
interaction of two connected agents with dierent opinions, see also [17]. Let
us stress that in both models, no tolerance parameters are introduced, as in
Schelling-type models.
Here we are considering a time interval in which languages remain the
same or change slowly, but which comprises several generations of individuals.
Thus an agent which changes its language two or more times represents
dierent individuals. Also, we can think of each agent as a small group
of people (a block, a family), and we dene this agents language as the
predominant one among the members of the group.
In a separate work [18], we analyze several aspects of the Schelling-Voter
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model. We introduce a slight modication in the spirit of [19, 20] (i.e.,
enabling also happy agents to change color or location with very low proba-
bility), and we study their properties with statistical mechanic techniques.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section x2 we describe the model.
The results of simulations are presented in Section x3, and in Section x4
we analyze language patterns in term of dierent equilibria obtained in the
simulations.
2. The Schelling-Voter Model
In this model, we consider a population of N agents, each one located
in a dierent site of a square lattice of side L, and labeled as b or w (not
necessarily black or white, but the language he speaks, or the social variable
or belief he supports). We introduce the following global parameters:
 1   2 (0; 1), the density of empty sites, dened as  = N
L2
.
 T 2 [0; 1], the tolerance, equal for all agents.
 s 2 (0; 1), the prestige of language b; the prestige of w is 1  s.
 p 2 [0; 1] the possibility to migrate, the same for all agents.
For a given notion of neighborhood (we have considered the Moore neigh-
borhood of each agent, which comprises the eight sites surrounding his loca-
tion) we say that an agent is unhappy when the ratio between the number
of agents of the opposite language and the number of agents in his neighbor-
hood is greater than T . Now, an unhappy agent can play one of two dierent
games:
 (Schelling) The agent tries to change his location, choosing a new one
at random among the empty sites in the lattice, where the agent is
bound to be happy.
 (Voter) The agent tries to change his color/language.
The unhappy agent will play Schelling dynamics with probability p, and
he will play Voter dynamics with probability 1   p. We can interpret prob-
ability p as a balance between the ease and the diculty to migrate and to
learn a new language.
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In both cases the change is not mandatory, the migration can fail if the
agent is unhappy in any empty space. The language change would depend on
some probabilities qb!w, qw!b which can include both the number of agents
of each language (locally or globally measured), and the perceived prestige
of the other language.
In this work, we focus on the results of the size of the populations speaking
each language when the system stabilizes. We leave aside several measures
related to statistical mechanics, see [18].
3. Simulations
We start with two similar populations in a square lattice of side L = 50,
with free boundary conditions. We assign the same prestige s = 0:5 to both
languages. For dierent values of T between 0.2 and 0.6 we obtain qualitative
similar results, and we show here only the simulations for T = 0:3. We run
simulations for p and 1  in the range between 0:02 and 0:98 in FORTRAN
90. At the beginning, we lled each site of the lattice with an agent with
probability , and labeled each one as b or w with the same probability.
In the model, we take an agent at random, then we check his tolerance.
If the agent is unhappy, then he will try to migrate (with probability p) or
he will try to learn the other language (with probability 1  p).
When the agent tries to nd a new place of residence, we choose one
at random among the available empty sites where the agent is bound to
be happy; if the agent tries to change the language, we use the transition
probabilities as in [6]
qb!w =
W
2(B +W )
qw!b =
B
2(B +W )
;
where B (respectively, W ) is the number of agents speaking language b in
the population (resp., w).
Figure 1 shows the dependence of the size of the minority language pop-
ulation (S) on the empty space density 1    for dierent values of p from
0:1 to 0:9. We observe that the size of the population increases quickly with
, and then reaches an almost xed value close to one-half of the total pop-
ulation. The behavior of the dierent curves is similar, the dierences being
due to nite size eects.
Figure 2 shows the size of the smaller population (S) as a function of p
for dierent values of 1    from 0:1 to 0:9. In the case 1     0:1 both
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Figure 1: Size of the population speaking the minority language (S) as a function of p for
dierent values of 1    and T = 0:3. In simulations, N = 2500 agents asynchronously
evolve. Results are obtained by averaging 30 realizations of 50000 time steps each, or until
the systems stabilizes in the sense that 99 per cent of the population is happy.
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Figure 2: Size of the population speaking the minority language (S) as a function of 1  
for dierent values of p and T = 0:3. In simulations, N = 2500 agents asynchronously
evolve. Results are obtained by averaging 30 realizations of 50000 time steps each, or until
the systems stabilizes in the sense that 99 per cent of the population is happy.
6
0 20 40 60 80
0
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
t
a v
a
i l a
b l
e  
e m
p t
y  
s p
a c
e s
 p = 0.1
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 0
2 5
3 0
t
a v
a
i l a
b l
e  
e m
p t
y  
s p
a c
e s
 p = 0.3
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 0
2 5
3 0
t
a v
a
i l a
b l
e  
e m
p t
y  
s p
a c
e s
 p = 0.7
0 50 100 150
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 0
2 5
3 0
t
a v
a
i l a
b l
e  
e m
p t
y  
s p
a c
e s
 p = 0.8
Figure 3: Amount of available empty spaces for one of the population (circles) and for
the other one (plus symbols) for some values of p = 0:1; 0:5; 0:7 and 0:8 as a function of
time. In each case, one realization is performed for the case of 1   = 0:06 and N = 2500
agents. Circle symbols represent those population who obtain advantage in this particular
realization.
populations results with no available empty spaces to move in, at the second
time step of the dynamics, and after some rounds in which only language
changes occur, empty spaces become available for one of them (see Figure
3).
Finally, Figure 4 shows the phase diagram in the variables (1 )-p. There
are three clearly identied regions:
 In region 1 we nd extinction of one of the languages. For p small, they
are essentially playing the voter model. When 1   is too small, since
unhappy agents can not nd comfortable places and there is no room
for an interphase separating agents, they sooner or later change their
language.
 In region 2 we observe another phenomenon: ghetto formation.
 In region 3 both populations coexist with similar sizes. However, we
have two type of nal states, the ones where both languages have a clear
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Figure 4: Below circle symbols there are those cases which result in the extinction of one
population, with values of hSi < 0:1. Between circle and plus symbols, there are those
which result in the formation of guettos, with values of 0:1 < hSi < 0:45. Beyond plus
symbols, there are those cases which result in the coexistence of the two populations, with
values of hSi > 0:45. Cases of  > 0:7 are diluted ones. Values of hSi were obtained by
averaging S for 30 realizations of 5000 time steps each (or until the systems stabilizes)
N = 2500 agents and T = 0:3 by varying p and 1    by steps of 0.02. The inset of the
Figure shows some examples of nal congurations for each region.
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segregation, and another one where both populations remain almost
like in the initial distribution, since the low population density gives
few opportunities to change language or location (diluted case).
4. An Application to Language Competition
Let us focus now on the problem of language competition. We can inter-
pret the tolerance parameter T as a mix between the acceptance of speakers
of the other language, and the critical or maximum acceptable level of di-
culty to interact with the neighbors of the other language group (getting a
job, education for the kids, medical care, buying basic goods/services, etc.).
Beyond T , the agent must decide between changing location or adopting the
other language. Here, we can think that p is high when the diculty to learn
the other language is high or when it is easy to move to other sites, and p
is small when it is dicult to move from one site to another one, or both
languages are similar in diculty.
Let us analyze Figure 4 and the typical congurations of the lattice in
each region of the phase space when the system stabilizes.
In region 1 we can see that only one language remains. This is the case
of extinct and endangered languages. A low-prestige language is faced with
extinction, since it cannot survive integrated to a higher-prestige population
which prefers to ignore it. There are several examples of this situation, see
[1, 11], the book of Harrison [21], and the one of Nettle and Romaine [22].
Above this zone, in region 2, there are coexistence of the two populations
and ghetto formation. Here, both languages survive, and they are arranged
in disjoint zones. We can observe this kind of segregation in Asian and Latino
communities in maps of Chicago, see [23]. Similar maps were constructed for
other American cities, see [24].
From US Census Data [25], almost 30 percent of the population older
than 5 years who speak Spanish, Chinese, or Korean languages at home,
speak English \not well" or \not at all". So, we can safely conclude that the
segregation by ethnicity observed in the maps is also segregation by language.
In region 3, there are two dierent phenomena. At the center of the gure
we have coexistence of languages, with two segregated populations. In some
sense, this is the usual distribution of nations which grow and nally reach
a steady state, each one with its own language. Also, Sub-Saharan Western
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Africa is an example of several coexisting languages with high density of
people. In particular, Nigeria has more than 500 languages belonging to
at least three main families (Nilo-Saharan, Afro-Asiatic, and Niger-Congo),
with around 169 million people, and 950.000 km2; the density of inhabitants
is higher than the one of the European Union. The language maps show a
mixed pattern of coexistence (at west, map 1 in [11]) and segregation (at
east, maps 4 and 5 in [11]).
With half Nigeria's density, Benin, Ghana and Togo have several lan-
guages. The two main families (Gur, Kwa) in Ghana are clearly segregated,
with a natural border around the bifurcation of the Black and White Volta
Rivers. Nevertheless, at least 30 dierent languages coexist in each zone (see
map from [11]).
Let us note that in this zone of Africa there exists a high degree of mobility
of people, and small groups of people spread or merge, forming new groups,
changing their languages and cultures, as D'Azevedo has described in [26]:
Cultural pluralism, multilingualism, and multiple local traditions
of origin and "ethnicity" obtain within situations that are only
supercially and frequently only temporarily characterized by
a predominant "tribal" orientation. (...) Throughout northern
and western Liberia institutional structures and most cultural
features are so generally distributed that it is no exaggeration to
suggest that tribal identication is as much a matter of individual
choice as of the ascribed status of birth, language, or distinctive
customs.
Finally, let us consider the right hand side of the Figure 4, which corre-
spond to zones with a low-density of population. We mention two possible
examples of this situation. The Sahara Desert covers over 80% of Niger,
and the country has a very low population density (around 12 persons per
km2). Around the Tenere Desert (Tenere means desert in Tuareg language),
several dierent languages coexist, belonging to three dierent families (see
map from [11]).
A similar picture can be found in the North part of the Kalahari's Desert
basin, where several languages belonging to the Bantu and Khoisan families
coexist, in Namibia and Bostwana. Namibia has the second lowest population
density in the world, with 2.5 hab/km2, and Boswana has 2.7 hab/km2.
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In both cases, the overlapping of languages of dierent families in the
same zone, and the low density of populations suggest a coexistence in a
diluted state, with few interactions.
5. Conclusions
We have presented an agent-based model which dynamics is a mix be-
tween Schelling's segregation model and the Voter model. A probability
parameter p governs which dynamics is used each time an agent feels un-
comfortable within its neighborhood. The agent feels uncomfortable when
the proportion of neighbors of the other type exceeds a given tolerance pa-
rameter T . The other relevant parameter in the model is the density of
empty locations, a low density constrains the possibility of an agent to nd
an acceptable site to move.
When the typical Voter model is played, an agent changes automatically
its color by selecting another agent at random. Here, we introduce an addi-
tional parameter, the prestige or status of each color, following the model of
Abraham and Strogatz of language competition. However, since we have set
this parameter equal to one half, this represents only a change on the tem-
poral scale, and it is twice more probable to change location than language.
We have started with similar populations, spread out at random on a
square lattice, and show that the system stabilizes in few options: extinction
of one of the colors/languages, ghetto formation, segregated coexistence, or
diluted coexistence. Finally, we have shown several examples of those possi-
bilities in the actual distribution of languages in the world.
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